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Abstract 
The African Recovery Journal once referred to it as,
‘an opportunity for African countries to attract new
financing for their own sustainable development’. It
was indeed waited for with much anticipation. In
fact, today, it is readily observable that the interna-
tional Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) mar-
ket is becoming increasingly dynamic and projected
to grow exponentially. However, judging from hard
facts on the ground, the reality in sub-Saharan
Africa is grim. Moreover, analysts are forecasting a
convergence in the market; towards a focus on a
few project types in a limited number of host coun-
tries. On this scale both, Kenya and Uganda are
non-existent as are the rest of their sub-Sahara
African compatriots.
This paper briefly looks at the history of the
CDM and what could have gone wrong for an
instrument that had so much promise for sub-
Saharan Africa.
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, Kyoto Protocol,
clean development mechanism
1. Introduction
The African Recovery Journal (Ukabiala, 2002)
once referred to it as, ‘an opportunity for African
countries to attract new financing for their own sus-
tainable development’. It was indeed waited for
with much anticipation (RISO, 1999; SCEE 1998;
Sokona et al 1998). In fact, today, the international
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market is
becoming increasingly dynamic (The Carbon
Market Analyst, April 2004) and projected to grow
exponentially. However, judging from hard facts on
the ground (Thomas, 2003; Editorial, 2003;
Pembleton, 2003; Tippmann, et al 2003) the reality
in sub-Saharan Africa is grim. Moreover, analysts
(The Carbon Market Analyst (Oct 2004); The
Carbon Market Analyst (March 2004)) are forecast-
ing a convergence in the market, towards a focus
on a few project types in a limited number of host
countries.
In the January 2005, CDM rankings for host
countries (Point Carbon, CDM/JI Monitor Jan
2005) (see Appendix), even the leading continental
industrial giant, South Africa, came in a poor 9th
position out of 12. Moreover, it had a B rating
which is described as having, ‘to a limited extent’,
established a CDM/Joint Implementation (JI)-relat-
ed organisational apparatus; has limited CDM/JI
project experience; and (most importantly) ‘the
investment climate is only barely acceptable.’ This
ranking was subsequently downgraded to a rating,
CCC at 11th position by May 2005. On this scale,
both Kenya and Uganda are non-existent as are the
rest of their sub-Sahara African compatriots.
It would therefore appear that the state-of-the-
art Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is nei-
ther the panacea for African problems that it was
touted to be nor does it really (in its present format)
have much (if anything) to do with the continent’s
development goals. It could in fact be argued that
its creation could be doing more harm than good by
distracting sub-Saharan Africa from its main focus
namely attracting serious foreign investors. 
Looking at the history of events up-to-date
UNFCCC (2005) there is in fact reason to suggest
that politics rather than science has advised inter-
national environmental policies and decisions. This
paper briefly looks at the history of the CDM and
what could have gone wrong for an instrument that
had so much promise for sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Background
Briefly, in the mid 20th century, a broad environ-
ment movement developed largely out of concerns
about environmental pollution (Hays, 2000).
Despite original misgivings, their thinking is now
mainstream and has formed the cornerstone of a
number of major international agreements.
The original model (Hollinshead, 2003) was
based on a carbon dioxide filled atmosphere (as
result of human activity, notably after the beginning
of the industrial revolution) normally letting in the
sun’s energy but trapping in infrared radiation from
escaping and resulting in a net gain in atmospheric
temperature. Hence, the term global warming.
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Subsequently developments led to the 1987
Brundtland Report: ‘Our common future’ by the
UN World Commission on Environment and
Development. This, in turn, gave birth to (among
others) the ubiquitous term sustainability, which it
defined as, ‘Meeting the needs of the present gen-
eration without compromising the ability for future
generations to meet theirs.’
This seemingly benign statement has, however,
turned out to have much deeper implications than
perhaps even the author of the document had
anticipated. It has unearthed a host of economic,
political and ethical issues. Eighteen years on and
the world is still grappling with how (and at times
whether) to begin implementing what Brundtland
meant.
In the meantime, the United Nations mooted the
UNFCCC (a Framework Convention on Climate
Change) (UNFCCC, 2005) to coordinate interna-
tional activities and treaties to address issues main-
ly raised by the Brundtland Commission.
The latest of these treaties is known as the Kyoto
Protocol (KP) (Mustafa Babiker et al, 2000; Climate
Change Secretariat, 2002; A User’s guide to the
CDM 2nd Edition) which (after satisfying the rele-
vant political provisions) entered into force on the
16th of February 2005. It aims to set targets for the
reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and
all other greenhouse gases (GHG). To achieve this,
it sets up the so-called Kyoto Mechanisms. 
These are three market-based instruments that
allow industrialised countries to meet their GHG
reduction targets. They are the Joint Implemen-
tation (JI), the International Emissions Trading (IET)
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The fundamental model used by these instru-
ments is based on the concept that a ton of carbon
dioxide produced anywhere on earth has the same
degradation impact on the environment. However,
the cost of mitigating the production of that ton
varies depending on which part of the world you
are in. Therefore, through collaboration, countries
that are unable to achieve their emission targets at
home can go across their borders or abroad and
earn the shortfalls in their targets. 
The first two instruments (JI and IET) are only
applicable in the industrialized world and only the
CDM is available to the Third World. It states in part
(A User’s guide to the CDM 2nd Edition): 
The purpose of the CDM shall be to assist
Parties not included in Annex I (the have-nots)
in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the
Convention’ and the Annex I Parties (the haves)
in ‘achieving compliance with their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commit-
ments’.
JI and IET transactions are carried out through
a reasonably straightforward barter-like system.
Moreover, the modes of business transactions as
well as political objectives are often similar and an
inevitable atmosphere of mutual respect is bound to
prevail. 
The CDM on the other hand, involves mis-
matched developed/Third World dealers and is rid-
dled with seemingly endless controversies (VIEW-
POINT, 2004). Firstly, the dissimilarity means that
some form of foreign exchange currency: in this
case certifiable emission credits (CERS) must be
used. Thus, CO2 becomes the international curren-
cy of tomorrow. One CER is equivalent to the miti-
gation of 1 ton of CO2 or its equivalent.
This then leads to how much value the com-
modity being discussed is and the criteria that must
be used in this evaluation. Then the ‘principles,
modalities, rules and guidelines’ emerge and their
interpretation is a major point of contention. A lot of
‘gray’ areas and ground for haggling still pose major
challenges. This is especially so for the Third World
‘partner’ for whom, as it most often turns out, the
number of available alternatives are far less than
his/her First World counterpart. Therefore, an
inevitable atmosphere of unequal partners (bene-
factor/beneficiary) often prevails. Even in those
countries that have gone some way in developing
their administrative infrastructure like Malaysia,
complaints abound of the absence of the ‘equity
spirit embodied in the original KP’ from the would
be investors (Boyee Veronique 2004). 
3. How do the circumstances compare
between the two worlds?
In this case, an illustration will be made by a simple
comparison between, Canada (as a typical First
World country) and Kenya (as a typical sub-Sahara
African country).
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December
2002 and committed itself to reducing its emissions
of greenhouse gases to 6% below 1990 levels (the
figure of 6% varies from country to country and the
criteria appears to be quite arbitrary. 1990 is the
standard base year but even this is different for
some so-called economies in transition, like
Russia.). The emission targets are to be met in the
time frame between 2008 to 2012.
As a preamble, the Canadian government had
drawn up a climate change plan on the 21st
November 2002 (Climate Change Plan for Canada,
2002). The industries would be expected to take a
share of responsibility to meet the national target.
‘The Plan was the result of intensive consultation
with the provinces and territories, as well as with
stakeholders and individual Canadians to ensure
uninterrupted competitiveness and growth.’
The targets would be met through a range of
mechanisms locally and abroad. The Canadian
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government created a CDM office to develop and
disseminate information to Canadian industries
participating in these projects. It is, however, not
mandatory for Canadian companies to operate
through this office. Canadian industries can then
look at and select proposals from Third World coun-
tries that are eligible and decide which ones best
suit their interests at the most affordable rates.
Kenya (on the other hand) ratified the UNFCCC
on the 30th August 1994, and is a willing participant
as a non-annex 1 party of the Kyoto Protocol. Like
all non-annex I members, it has no obligation to
meet any emission targets but as a developing
country, it is very keen to take advantage of any
investment opportunities.
In order to be eligible for participation, Kenya
must create a designated national authority (DNA)
through which local stakeholders can carry out
CDM transactions. The authority is responsible for,
among other things, the identification of projects
that meet the ‘Rules and Procedures Governing
CDM Projects’. These include that the project leads
to ‘real and measurable reduction (or absorption)’.
The project must also reduce emissions to levels
that would have occurred without it. The authority
has an additional onus to prove that the project
would not have been implemented without the
CDM. In addition, the DNA must also publish a
document by which it defines the term sustainabili-
ty, in the context of that country. This document is
then used as a future benchmark for CDM projects
in the country. 
Unlike Canada with adequate infrastructure and
resources, Kenya must invest its meagre resources
in order to meet these conditions. Moreover, unlike
the Canadian stakeholders, there was hardly any
involvement of Kenyan local entrepreneurs in any
of the policy processes. This is despite the fact that
the procedure is a requirement of the KP. 
There is an international effort to address these
institutional and manpower problems through
mechanisms like capacity development for CDM
(CD4CDM) (UNEP RISO Centre, http://cd4cdm.
org/). This author has also subsequently learnt that
during the period of reviewing this paper, further
improvements in the approval process were effect-
ed. This includes approval via email (cdm-
info@unfcc.int). 
In the meantime, ordinary life in Kenya goes on
in a different plane. The bulk of economic activities
in sub-Saharan Africa are small-scale individual
concerns. But like most sub-Sahara African coun-
tries, Kenya treats most of these economic activities
by its ordinary citizens as informal: apparently
meaning that they are inconsequential. 
Ironically the incomes from some of these ‘infor-
mal’ transactions often rival and sometimes exceed
official activity. For example, banks in Dakar,
Senegal, estimate that Senegalese traders and
workers abroad send back $40 million a month,
equivalent to 60 per cent of the country’s economy
(ESRC, 2004). 
Similar figures could be quoted for Zambia,
Uganda or Kenya where large percentages of stocks
of automotive spare parts, for example, have for
many years been recovered from (mainly) Japanese
automobile dumpsites (Agumba et al, 2000). The
cellular communications industry in Africa is boom-
ing; thanks to fashion trend driven First-World con-
sumers, whose discarded old sets have found ready
markets in Uganda, Kenya and elsewhere. These
governments continually plead ignorance of such
issues even as the imports are properly document-
ed and duly taxed. One plausible explanation could
be that Africa governments are ashamed to
acknowledge that the informal sectors do in fact
outperform them.
Consequently, many international negotiations
and treaties signed by African governments are
devoid of issues that have relevance to (or comple-
ment) grassroots development. For example, one
could argue that such activities do, in fact, mitigate
carbon dioxide emissions and should therefore earn
some ‘carbon credits’. In fact, these countries liter-
ally spend their meagre incomes to clean up the
west. However, recipient communities would stand
to benefit from the relevant UNFCCC provisions
only if their governments had the insight to argue
for such cases in New York, as the UN only recog-
nises sovereign states as legitimate entities. 
Additionally, the largely hydropower supported
Kenyan national grid from which its industry runs
(for example) has a meagre capacity of just over
1000 megawatts (Agumba et al (2000); Hankins,
(2001), even as Kenya is the regional ‘industrial
giant’. This is when compared to Uganda, for exam-
ple, whose capacity is less than 30% of Kenya.
Moreover, the bulk (75%) of Kenyans (like the
majority of sub-Sahara Africans) live in the rural
areas where the main activity namely, agriculture, is
largely human and animal powered. The main fuel
for thermal energy requirements (90%) is biomass,
which contrary to popular belief, is zero emission
rated: meaning that the process of extracting ener-
gy out of it does not constitute additional green-
house gases to the environment. Thus, no serious
viability can be expected in any cleanup investment
as, clearly, no pollution does occur in the first place.
This massive use of biomass in sub-Saharan
Africa however, has well documented sustainability
issues. For example, the East African sub-region
continues to grapple with chronic droughts resulting
in massive power and food shortages and the threat
of desertification looms large. This affects the envi-
ronment hosting vulnerable communities and
should be clearly the concern of the KP imple-
menters. 
There is therefore urgent need for reforestation
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and afforestation. These along with agricultural
activities result in the so-called emission removal
units (ERU) by land use (or carbon sinks) under
Article 3 of the Protocol. Clearly these are areas that
should attract substantial CDM investments, and
reap massive benefits for both sub-Saharan Africa
and the environment. In fact, with massive tracts of
marginal lands that should be afforested, ERUs are
not only necessary but constitute Africa’s only cred-
ible capacity to participate (meaningfully) in the
international CDM market.
Unfortunately, for sub-Saharan Africa, Canad-
ian companies are currently only allowed to partic-
ipate in such projects under very unattractive con-
ditions. Initially excluded altogether, carbon sinks
are only allowed to clear up to a maximum of 1%
of an investor’s emission target allotment while the
ceiling for industrial activities has been set at 100%.
In addition, while industrial credits can be banked
for future use, ERUs cannot. Thus, rendering the
option a non-starter! Not surprisingly, therefore,
there is widespread suspicion in Africa that politics
rather than science has advised the issues of the KP. 
4. Concluding remarks
From the above, it would appear that the spirit of
the KP, and in particular, the CDM may have aimed
to promote sustainability and equity. However, by
seeking to exclusively use market forces to achieve
these goals, a fundamental flaw in the solution may
have been (perhaps inadvertently) inserted right
from the start. 
Secondly, the treatment of carbon dioxide emis-
sion as the de facto benchmark for development is
a sad anomaly. By contrast, many ordinary Africans
engage in activities that sink rather than emit CO2
and, hence, replenish rather than degrade the envi-
ronment. In return, they continue to experience
deteriorating climatic conditions and desertification,
which are evidently the result of industrial activity in
the developed world. 
The reality is that Africa is yet to realize its indus-
trial revolution. Not surprisingly, therefore, these
countries grapple with confusion as to how to apply
post industrial revolution remedies to their circum-
stances. 
Solutions to African development, however,
need not follow the same path as that of the devel-
oped world and the yardstick for African develop-
ment should not be how accurately they mimic the
West. Instead, relevant technical solutions for
advanced applications in the developed world
could be used to leapfrog intermediate technologies
and applied directly, with benefit to the developing
countries and the environment. Currently, as well as
the foreseeable future, biomass is decidedly the
thermal fuel of choice in rural sub-Saharan Africa.
This should be the area to focus on in terms of
research and investment. 
Additionally, if equity was considered then con-
certed efforts would be made to invest in renew-
ables for rural lighting in sub-Saharan Africa. With
kerosene as the dominant lighting fuel, this choice is
a matter of life and death for many African children
(Mumford, 1987).
All may not be lost as many of these issues are
in fact still being negotiated. However, a lot of
ground would be gained if Africans themselves
pressed for their case with vigour. Given the history
of events, it would be naïve for Africa to expect that
outsiders will volunteer on their behalf.
Appendix
Country Rating Last 
(3 May 2005) 
1. India BBB (1, BBB) 
2. Chile BBB- (2, BB+) 
3. Brazil BB (3, BB+) 
4. China BB- (6, B+) 
5. Mexico BB- (5, B) 
6. Korea B+ (4, B+) 
7. Peru B (7, B) 
8. Morocco B (8, B) 
9. Malaysia B (9, B) 
10. Vietnam CCC+ (10, CCC) 
11. South Africa CCC (11, CCC) 
12. Thailand CCC (13, CCC-) 
13. Indonesia CCC- (12, CCC-) 
Afforestation: This is the direct human-induced con-
version of land that has not been forested for a peri-
od of at least 50 years to forested land through
planting, seeding and/or the promotion of natural
seed sources. Agroforestry projects that fulfil the
specified requirements are included.
Land Restoration: This is the direct human-induced
conversion of non-forested land to forested land
occurring on lands that did not contain forest on 31
December 1989. Agroforestry projects that fulfil the
specified requirements are included. Rehabilitation
is the reestablishment of natural forest on existing
degraded forest land.
Carbon-Storage-Enhancement: All projects based
on Forest Management options according to Article
3.4 – Kyoto Protocol leading to biomass enrich-
ment.
Forest Conservation: All projects based on protec-
tion and the promotion of ‘wood energy’ will be an
important part of this. A further extension of the
concept of switching from fossil fuels to sustainably
grown fuel wood largely depends on solving the
sustainable wood supply problem. The potential
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demand and market for fuel-switch investments
especially in the new EU member states is immense.
For example, in Poland small district heating sys-
tems supply heat to more than 50% of private
households. About 6 000 district heating systems in
Poland – without taking into account industrial sys-
tems – run on outdated and inefficient coal-fired
generation. Fuel wood afforestation of marginal
agricultural areas could provide wood at prices that
make wood energy competitive with fossil fuels
and, at the same time, create job opportunities in
rural areas. 
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